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1. Introduction 
 
In vision sciences the multiform category of phenomena known as il-
lusions are most often treated as errors or mistakes made by the visual sys-
tem (Gregory et al. 1995). This view is almost always coupled with notion 
of veridicality and veridical perception (Rock 1983). The notion of veridi-
cal perception implies that in some cases we do not see what we should see, 
and that in other cases we see exactly what should be seen. Hence, two 
simple but intriguing questions arise: (1) Given a visual scene, what is it 
that we should exactly see? (2) How do we know that what we should see is 
actually what we are seeing? Experimental research on illusions often deals 
sideways with these questions, and seldom comes up with a straight an-
swer. 
The variety of visual illusions is huge, and counting also the numerous 
versions that exist of a same illusion (Da Pos & Zambianchi 1996), the 
field comprises a rich bestiary of “curious” phenomena. To frame our in-
vestigation we will consider only those illusions that are made of two ob-
jects that should look alike along some, or all, dimensions – given that their 
respective physical characteristics are identical – but that appear different 
because of other surrounding features in the visual scene. For sake of sim-
plicity we shall call this type of phenomena “comparison illusions”.1 In 
particular, we will be writing about this class of illusions in lightness 
perception. 
                                                      
* Department of Psychology “Gaetano Kanizsa”, University of Trieste. 
** Psychology Department, University of Milano-Bicocca. 
1 The term is used only as shorthand; all illusions are actually of a “comparison” type, 
since the acknowledgement that one is experiencing an illusion implies a comparison be-
tween what is perceived and the knowledge and the expectations of the observer. 
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Researching the mechanisms or conditions that underlie an illusion 
usually goes hand in hand with a quantification of its magnitude. This last 
aspect, however, can be tricky, for some term of comparison is needed. 
With comparison illusions there are usually two alternatives: 
- A measurement of the perceptual differences between two objects that do 
not appear equal despite their corresponding physical dimensions are equal. 
This is what we call a “within approach”, and the basic question sounds 
like: how different are the two objects?  
- A measurement of the differences between the perceptual dimensions of 
the two objects and their corresponding physical dimensions, to determine 
the magnitude of the errors made by the visual system. This is what we call 
a “between approach”, and the basic question sounds like: which of the two 
physically equal objects shows a bigger departure from their actual (physi-
cal) dimension? 
The within approach is epistemologically safe: the researcher stays 
within the phenomenal domain and eventually uses physical units as a nu-
meric expression of the quantifications carried out, without bothering to ask 
which of the two objects is more responsible for the illusion. 
The between approach is instead epistemologically more problematic. 
Lets just consider one of the problems: which of the two perceived objects 
of a comparison illusion is closer to its physical model? The between ap-
proach is closely related to two very different ways of thinking how the 
visual system works: (1) the visual system has direct access to the structure 
of the physical scene, in the sense that it sees what is actually there: things 
appear as they do because they are what they are (Gibson, 1979); (2) the 
visual system generates a good enough replica of the physical scene by 
means of inferences on raw sensations based on logical and statistical as-
sumptions driven by cues and past experience (Rock, 1983; Knill & Rich-
ards, 1996). Given that both these theoretical views meet large approval in 
the field of perceptual sciences, it is not surprising that the between ap-
proach nourishes the interest and indeed the fantasies of many vision scien-
tists 
Instead of developing logical arguments against the between approach 
and all the metaphysics that go along with it, we shall try to generate some 
doubt about the usefulness of the concept of error in visual sciences by re-
porting the results of an experiment we carried out in the field of lightness 
perception. 
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2. The “locus of error” paradigm 
 
The phenomenon we examined is simultaneous lightness contrast 
(SLC)2, which has served as a test-bench for many lightness theories. A 
question that can be asked is the following: where does the visual system go 
wrong when in a SLC display it assigns different lightness values to targets 
that are photometrically equal? This question specifically targets the locus 
of error of the illusion and it is at the base of a clever experimental para-
digm developed by Gilchrist et al. (1999). 
The question is not trivial: if we were able to answer similar questions 
we could easily reject theories that make wrong predictions with reference 
to both the direction and the magnitude of certain illusions. In fact, we 
think it is quite fair to claim that in the field of lightness perception this is a 
core question for different theories, from classic contrast theories to more 
recent approaches such as the Anchoring theory (Gilchrist, 2006). The An-
choring theory in particular is explicitly based and developed on the notion 
of errors (Gilchrist et al., 1999), which are to be considered as the trade-
mark of the visual system, as Gilchrist (2006) himself puts it.  
Recently Economou, Zdravkovic, & Gilchrist (2007) applied the locus 
of error paradigm to SLC displays employing a matching method. The 
method consists in finding the matches of each target on an achromatic 
Munsell scale. The scale they used ranged from Munsell 2.0 to Munsell 9.5 
by means of 16 equally spaced rectangular chips placed from darkest to 
lightest on a white-black chequered background. Based on the Anchoring 
theory, the authors predicted a major error for targets on the black back-
ground against no or a small error for targets on the white background (Fig. 
1). According to their arguments, both classic lateral inhibition models and 
more recent low level models, such as ODOG (Oriented Differences of 
Gaussians, Blackeslee & McCourt, 2003), should predict instead different 
or even opposite results in terms of the magnitudes of the illusion. The re-
sults of their experiments largely agree with the predictions based on the 
Anchoring theory (Figure 2A). 
Our intent is not to challenge the findings or the conclusions of 
Economou et al. (2007); rather we want to verify the robustness of the 
Neutral Value Munsell scale. In fact, the problem is of a methodological 
                                                       
2 The phenomenon is also known as “simultaneous brightness contrast” or just “si-
multaneous contrast”. While the last term is too generic, the first is older and dates back to 
the days in which many researchers were convinced that simple lateral inhibition models 
were able to account for the illusion. 
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nature, but it does not concern the matching method per se. Rather, the 
problem is related to the question that is being asked: which of the two 
targets shows the biggest departure from its actual value? This question 
requires, in fact, a basic assumption: that the Munsell scale (MS) is capable 
of showing actual lightness values, i.e. veridical percepts. 
 
 
3. Veridicality and the Neutral Value Munsell Scale 
 
Error and veridicality are two faces of a same coin. In order to ac-
knowledge that something is wrong, you must assume that there is a truth-
ful or correct answer. According to the locus of error paradigm, the MS 
provides a way to quantify both the perceptual difference between lightness 
targets that are physically equal, and also the perceptual difference between 
a lightness target and its veridical lightness value, as displayed on the scale. 
This last point is critical for theories in lightness perception: if we know 
what the target should look like, we can find where the error lies, quantify 
it, and even model hypothetic mechanisms. 
At first glance the solution appears ideal. However there is an issue 
that ought to be addressed: is a Neutral Value Munsell scale actually capa-
ble of showing veridical lightness values? 
We must confess that we have no idea about what a veridical percept 
is, how it should look like, and how to distinguish it from a non-veridical 
percept. In our view, the distinction between veridical and non-veridical is 
pointless in visual perception. However, from a logical point of view we 
can speculate that a veridical percept should correspond to some perceptual 
feature of an object that does not change appearance despite relevant 
changes in the physical scene. 
In lightness literature, it is an established fact that the main issues 
about lightness constancy concern changes in the level of illumination of a 
surface target and changes in the luminance pattern surrounding a surface 
target (background). An achromatic MS is by all means a lightness scale 
derived by conducting psychophysical experiments (Judd & Nickerson, 
1975; Munsell, Sloan, & Godlove, 1933). The idea was to create interval 
scales to systemize and measure colour perception. However, in order to be 
able to speak about veridicality, a MS should not be affected by changes ei-
ther in its level of illumination or in the intensities of its background. 
Experiments concerning the robustness of an achromatic MS with uni-
form illumination modulations have already been carried out (Zavagno & 
Bressan, in preparation): the scale appears to be quite robust within a cer-
tain range of illumination variations. 
The concept of error in perception 179 
Here we present the results of an experiment that uses the locus of er-
ror paradigm but with three 16 step achromatic Munsell scales that differ 
only for the backgrounds against which they are seen (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Lightness scales on three different backgrounds. 
 
 
4. The experiment 
 
Munsell scales are usually employed with backgrounds that are either 
white-black chequered or completely white. We are aware of only one 
study that actually employed lightness-matching scales on different back-
grounds (Jandò et al., 2003). The aim of such study was to solve the prob-
lem of matching increment and decrement targets when a target does not 
seem to match any of the chips of a lightness scale. Last but not least, such 
study employed so-called simulated Munsell scales presented on a CRT. 
In our experiment we used targets and Munsell scales derived from 
actual Neutral Value Munsell papers. The question that underlies our work 
is the following: If we change the background against which a MS is seen, 
will we get the same lightness matches for SLC displays? 
To answer such a question we asked 48 observers to carry out light-
ness matches for a classic SLC display where the targets were two square 
patches (cm 2.2x2.2) cut from Munsell 6.0 paper, one placed on a white 
background and the other placed on a black background (cm 20x20). The 
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targets had a luminance of 900 cd/m
2
, the background luminances were re-
spectively 2400 and 80 cd/m
2
. The observers were assigned to three groups 
and each group used a MS on a specific background to perform the match-
ing task: a white background, a black background, and a white-black 
chequered background (Figure 1). The scales ranged from Munsell 2.0 to 
Munsell 9.5, and consisted of rectangular chips (cm 6 × 2.2) distanced 0.2 
cm from each other. MSs were placed 12 cm below the SLC display (Fig-
ure 1); the same spotlight illuminated display and scales. 
To summarize, we had a within subject variable (target background, 
TB: black, white) and a between subject variable (Munsell scale back-
ground, MSB: white, black, white-black checkers). 
Figure 2B shows the mean matches for the three levels of MSB; axes 
intersect at the actual log reflectance of the targets. An ANOVA for re-
peated measures, with MSB as between factor, was conducted on the data: 
both MSB (F2, 45=9.52, p<0,0005) and TB (F1,45= 96.135, p<0,0001) pro-
duced significant effects. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Axes intersect at the actual log reflectance value of the targets. Black and 
light grey bars stand for targets respectively on the black and on the white back-
ground. Numbers above bars indicate the amount of departure from the actual log 
reflectance value on the Munsell scales. (A) Data extrapolated from Economou, 
Zdravkovic, & Gilchrist (2007, p. 5, Fig. 3). The graph shows results for the condi-
tion “SLC and Munsell scale displayed both on paper”. (B) Results for matches 
carried out with equal Munsell scales on different backgrounds.  
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With respect to the target on the black background, unpaired t-tests 
show that the Munsell scales on the white and on the white-black chequ-
ered backgrounds, and Munsell scales on the white and on the black back-
grounds, determined matches that are statistically different (respectively: 
T30=2.67, p=0.012; T30=3.84, p=0.0006), while Munsell scales on the 
white-black chequered and the black backgrounds determined matches that 
were statistically indistinguishable (T30=1.09, p=0.2). As for the target on 
the white background, there is a tendency for a significant difference only 
between matches carried out with Munsell scales on the white and the black 
backgrounds (T30=1.99, p=0.055). 
With reference to the question we put forward, the main result of our 
experiment is that while matches for the target on the white background are 
relatively stable, those for the target on the black background are highly 
sensitive to the background against which a MS is seen. Given these re-
sults, can we still consider the achromatic MS a reliable instrument capable 
of showing veridical lightness values? 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Despite our results challenge the Anchoring theory in different ways3, 
the aim of this paper is not to question its validity, but to put forward an ar-
gument against the widespread use of the concepts of error and veridicality 
in visual perception sciences. 
Our findings, in fact, show that matches performed by using an 
achromatic MS can change depending on the background against which the 
scale is seen. In other words, the MS is not a perfect measuring instrument, 
in the sense that it does not belong to the physical domain: it is by all 
means a lightness scale, i.e. a psychophysical scale that lies entirely inside 
the phenomenological domain, hence it’s appearance can be affected by 
photo-geometric factors within a given visual scene, just like any other ob-
ject displaying lightness. Researchers should bear this in mind when they 
report and discuss their data. It is safe to use matching data to describe the 
directions of illusions and even to quantify the magnitude of lightness in-
duction between surface targets. However, even in this last case researchers 
should be aware of the fact that the value of their quantifications are rela-
                                                       
3 Just one example: by comparing results reported in Figure 2A-B one can notice that 
for chequered backgrounds we obtain the same amount of induction for the two targets, 
while the Anchoring theory predicts a greater induction effect for the target on the black 
background. 
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tive to the instrument they used to measure an effect. In fact, our data sug-
gests that lightness scales look less like a ruler and more like a rubber band 
with the average intensity of the scale’s background acting like a stretching 
the scale either from the black end or the white end. 
We nevertheless understand that one might still be tempted to consider 
the Munsell scale on the white-black chequered background as the only ap-
propriate scale to use. This would be true if we could ultimately say that a 
white-black chequered background is a neutral background that has no ef-
fect whatsoever on the MS. If this were the case, then such scale–
background combination would eventually be the only one capable of 
showing “veridical lightness”. This conclusion is however still question-
able. 
First of all, no background can be considered “neutral”, that is having 
no effect on a target placed on top of it. Neutral displays in visual percep-
tion just do not exist. Perception is about ratios and functional relationships 
among features inside the proximal stimulus; we believe there is very little 
space left for absolute intensities. 
Secondly, such a conclusion leads to an epistemological dead-end: 
how can we know that the lightness values on the Munsell scale seen 
against a white-black chequered background are veridical? What makes 
them more veridical than the values seen against a white or a black back-
ground? 
If veridicality is a concept devoid of empirical grounds in visual per-
ception, it is obvious that the notion of error is also in trouble. You cannot 
flip a coin that has only one side to it: such a coin just does not exist in our 
phenomenal world. 
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Abstract 
 
This work deals with the concepts of “error” and “veridicality” in visual perception 
studies by considering the matching paradigm often employed in empirical re-
search to study simultaneous lightness contrast (SLC). Matching paradigms often 
employ Neutral Value Munsell scales, and there is a strong tendency in the field to 
consider these scales as a ruler capable of showing veridical lightness values, that 
is perfect transformations of reflectance values into perceptual values. If this were 
the case, then Munsell scales should show high constancy to critical changes inside 
the visual scene. We performed an experiment in which three groups of observers 
were asked to perform a matching task for a classic SLC display. Each group used 
the same Munsell scale (MS) but seen against three different backgrounds: white, 
black, or white-black chequered. Results showed that the background against 
which the MS is seen heavily influences matches for the target on the black back-
ground of the SLC display. Our results support the claim that achromatic Munsell 
scales are not capable of showing veridical lightness values. 
 
 
Riassunto 
 
Questo lavoro si occupa dei concetti di “errore” e “veridicità” negli studi sulla per-
cezione visiva considerando il paradigma sperimentale del matching spesso utiliz-
zato nelle ricerche sul contrasto simultaneo di bianchezza (CSB). Il paradigma spe-
rimentale del matching impiega spesso scale create utilizzando carte Neutral Value 
Munsell, e vi è una tendenza abbastanza diffusa nel campo a considerare tali scale 
come un metro in grado di mostrare valori veridici di bianchezza, cioè trasforma-
zioni perfette di valori di riflettenza in valori percettivi. Se questo fosse vero, allora 
le scale Munsell dovrebbero mostrare un elevato valore di costanza a cambiamenti 
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critici in una scena visiva. Abbiamo condotto un esperimento in cui tre gruppi di 
osservatori dovevano trovare su una SM il valore di bianchezza corrispondente a 
quello dei target in una classica configurazione CSB. Ciascun gruppo ha utilizzato 
la stessa scala ma vista sopra uno dei seguenti sfondi: bianco, nero, a scacchi bian-
co-neri. I risultati mostrano una forte influenza dello sfondo della SM sulle valuta-
zioni di bianchezza per il target CSB su sfondo nero. I nostri risultati sono di sup-
porto all’affermazione secondo cui una scala Munsell non è in grado di mostrare 
valori veridici di bianchezza. 
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